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Abstract
We enhance a standard RBC model to account for military expenditure
and the costs of an internal conflict or war. The model captures the natural
trade-off in military expenditure: crowding out of private consumption and
investment but less destruction (and, therefore, higher marginal productiv-
ity) of private capital (and labor). Hence, military expenditure below (above)
a certain threshold generates a positive (negative) net benefit in terms of
output. The model is calibrated to an annual frequency using Colombian
data. We find that an increase in military expenditure of 1% GDP (the
current policy of Colombian authorities) increases investment and output
above the steady state during several periods, before the shock fades away.
Even though consumption falls on impact (to open up space for the addi-
tional military expenditure and private investment), it increases above its
stationary trend after three periods, remains on positive grounds thereafter,
and the cumulated net gain is positive.
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Resumen
A partir de la ampliaci￿n de un modelo estÆndar de ciclo de negocios
reales (RBC) se analiza el efecto del gasto militar y los costos de un conflicto
armado interno. El modelo captura el trade-off natural del gasto militar:
desplazamiento (crowding out) del consumo y la inversi￿n pero menor
destrucci￿n (y, por eso, mayor productividad marginal) del capital privado
(y el trabajo). As￿, un nivel de gasto militar por debajo (encima) de un
determinado umbral genera un beneficio neto positivo (negativo) en tØrminos
de producto. El modelo estÆ calibrado para una frecuencia anual utilizando
datos para Colombia. Se encuentra que un incremento en el gasto militar
de 1% del PIB (la pol￿tica actual de de las autoridades colombianas) aumenta
la inversi￿n y el producto por encima del estado estacionario durante varios
per￿odos antes de que el choque se desvanezca. Aunque el consumo cae
por el choque (para abrirle espacio al gasto militar y la inversi￿n privada
adicionales), Øste supera su tendencia de estado estacionario despuØs de
tres per￿odos, posteriormente sigue por encima, y la ganancia neta
acumulada es positiva.
Introduction
Colombia has endured an internal armed conflict during several decades1.
Yet, since 1999 the country experienced an escalation of the conflict that
has been accompanied by a severe slowdown of economic activity. The
following tables illustrate this fact.
1 The main actors of the conflict are, on one side, the FARC-EP (Armed Revolutionary
Forces of Colombia-People’s Army) and the ELN (National Liberation Army), the two
major leftist guerrilla groups; and, on the other side, the legitimate armed forces and the
majority of civil society. There are also right-winged, paramilitary, self-defense groups.
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Table 12.
Kidnappings Oil Duct Attacksa Blown Electricity Towers
1990 - 1998 1489 51 20
1999 - 2002 3269 103 339
          ∆% 120% 102% 1595%
a Only for the Caæolim￿n - Coveæas Oil Duct, given that data for other Oil Ducts is not
available for the whole period.
Even though several factors contributing to the post-1999 economic
contraction have been identified (capital outflow shock, banking crisis, fiscal
imbalances, etc.), the deterioration of the domestic conflict has been at the
core of the debate. It has been argued by policymakers that a permanent
increase in military expenditure is a necessary condition for the recovery of
economic growth. In fact, the government aims to increase military
expenditure permanently in at least 1% of GDP.
Table 23.
GDP Growth Rate Unemploymenta
1990 - 1998 3.64% 8.5%
1999 - 2002 0.40% 15.9%
            ∆ -3.24 bps +7.4 bps
a Unemployment data covers the whole national territory and goes from 1991 to 2002.
An interesting question arises: even if additional military expenditure stimulates
economic activity, will the benefit (in terms of additional output) outweigh its
cost (in terms of spent resources)? This paper tries to answer the latter question
by suggesting a real business cycle (RBC) model that incorporates military
expenditure and the costs of an internal conflict or war. The model captures
the natural trade-off in military expenditure: crowding-out of private
consumption and investment but less destruction (and, therefore, higher mar-
ginal productivity) of private capital and labor. Hence, in the model military
expenditure below (above) a certain threshold generates a positive (nega-
tive) net benefit in terms of output. Once calibrated to Colombian data, the
model reveals that an increase in military expenditure of 1% GDP is expan-
sionary in terms of output, investment and consumption.
2 Source: Ministerio de Defensa and Ministerio del Interior, Republic of Colombia.
3 Source: Ministerio de Hacienda y CrØdito Pœblico, Republic of Colombia.
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The proposed methodology has never been used in Colombia to study the
economic consequences of the internal armed conflict. Indeed, most of the
Colombian literature employs econometric techniques to analyze this
problem.
Different papers in the literature have studied the link between military ex-
penditure and economic activity. Knight et. al. (1996) make an extension
of the standard growth model and conclude that military spending has a
growth-retarding effect due to a negative impact on capital formation and
resource allocation. Stroup and Heckelman (2001) find that the effect of
military expenditure over economic growth in Africa and Latin America is
non-monotonic. Indeed, in their model military spending has a positive but
diminishing influence over growth if the size of the defense sector is small
relative to that of the rest of the economy; this influence turns negative as
this sector grows.
Athanassiou et. al. (1998) analyze empirically the impact of defense ex-
penditure over the Greek economy using two different methodologies: an
econometric model and a computable general equilibrium model. The re-
sults under both methodologies suggest that the defense sector in Greece
has had no positive impact over growth. The same result is found by
Nikolaidou (1998). Heo (1999) estimates a three-equation econometric
model with Korean data and concludes that there are indirect negative
effects of military spending over economic growth via exports and invest-
ment. A similar model is estimated for Taiwan by Huang (1999). This au-
thor finds a positive impact of defense spending over the non-export private
sector and a negative one over the more dynamic tradable sector. He also
finds that the latter effect offsets the former one.
There are other studies that indirectly address the link between military
spending and economic activity by highlighting the economic costs of
armed conflicts. For example, Collier (1995) analyzes the economic
effects of civil war and internal armed conflicts. He argues that civil war
reduces income both in a direct and an indirect way. An armed conflict
diminishes income directly through the diversion of resources into military
activity, and indirectly through the reduction of the capital stock (physical,
human and social). For instance, Imai and Weinstein (2000) show that
widespread civil wars are five times more costly than narrowly fought
internal conflicts and reduce economic growth by 1.25 percentage points
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a year. This result contrasts with that of Collier (1999) who estimated a
2.2 percentage point loss in the annual growth rate. Using panel data
for 147 countries, Hess and Pelz (2002) measure the welfare loss of
living in a non-peaceful world and find that the average cost of a con-
flict is 102.3 dollars per person. In a paper that studies the economic
causes of civil war Collier and Hoeffler (1998) suggest a model where
the probability of winning the war depends upon the capacity of the
government to defend itself, which is a positive function of military
expenditure. Thus, the higher the capacity of the government to finance
the defense sector (through a wide taxable base), the higher the chances
of dominating or neutralizing rebellion and avoiding the associated eco-
nomic costs. Indeed, Azam, Collier and Hoeffler (2001) recognize that
higher levels of military expenditure may deter rebellion by raising the
entry cost, but provide no empirical evidence to sustain this assertion.
However, in a study about the Colombian case, Echeverry et. al. (2001)
argue that an increase in military spending during a civil war may have
perverse effects for economic growth in the long run, mainly via
investment. On the other hand, Trujillo and Badel (1998) find that,
between 1991 and 1996, the cost of the armed conflict in Colombia
was between 1.5% and 1.1% of the annual GDP level. PØrez (2002)
finds that from 1999 to 2001 the costs generated by the destruction of
physical capital in Colombia represent 0.64% of GDP. Recently,
Contralor￿a General de la Repœblica (2002) estimated an average gross
cost of the Colombian armed conflict during the 1991 - 2001 period of
around 1.34% of annual GDP.
Mej￿a and Posada (2003) take a different approach to the link between
conflict and economic activity. They suggest a model that also reveals the
trade-off between allocating resources to the defense sector and employ-
ing them in the production of goods and services. Using a neoclassical
growth model, the authors explain the optimal allocation of labor force
between productive and deterrence activities when the economy is ex-
posed to terrorist attacks.
In order to carry out the cost-benefit analysis of the Colombian authorities’
decision to increase permanently military expenditure in at least 1% of GDP,
this paper suggests an RBC model that captures a simple trade-off in military
spending: crowding out of private spending (consumption and investment)
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against lesser destruction (and, therefore, higher marginal productivity)
of private capital and labor. As a result, military expenditure below (above)
a certain threshold generates a positive (negative) net benefit in terms of
output. The model is calibrated to an annual frequency using Colombian
data and is used to carry out an experiment consisting of a positive mili-
tary expenditure shock. The experiment reveals that an increase in mili-
tary spending of 1% GDP increases investment and output above the
steady state during several periods, before the shock fades away. The
cumulated net gain after 10 years surmounts to 215 dollars of additional
per capita GDP. Even though consumption falls on impact (to open up
space for the additional military expenditure and private investment), it
increases above its stationary trend after three periods and the cumu-
lated net gain is positive (9 dollars of additional per capita consumption
after 10 years).
Two caveats apply. First, the shock follows a stationary stochastic proc-
ess due to the nature of this class of models. Thus, the shock does not
capture literally a permanent increase in military spending. Still, the high
persistence of the shock captures a long-lasting increase in military ex-
penditure. Second, the model measures the net benefit of additional mili-
tary spending in terms of output (or welfare) levels, not economic growth.
The measurement of the net benefit in terms of higher output growth is a
topic for a different paper.
The paper is divided in five sections. This introduction is the first one. In the
second section the model is presented. Section three discusses the calibra-
tion of the model. In section four the results of the military expenditure
shock experiment are presented. Section five concludes.
I. Model
Consider an economy inhabited by an infinite number of identical, infinitely-
lived, risk-averse households that discount the future at rate   1/ 1 β − . The
mass of households is one. In every period each household is endowed
with one unit of time to be allocated between labor and leisure. Labor is
indivisible like in Hansen (1985). The shift length is fixed at h<1 units of
time and each household sends a fraction n of its members to work while
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the remaining fraction (1-n) does not work at all. Households have log
utility in consumption (c) and leisure:
) 1 log( ) 1 ( ) 1 log( log n h n c U t t − + − + =
) 1 log( ) log( h n c − + =
Each household owns capital (k) which is used to transfer purchasing power
across periods. The capital stock depreciates at rate δ. The final good of
this economy, which is the numeraire, is produced with a Cobb-Douglas
technology in capital and labor, subject to random productivity shocks
[exp(z)]. Indeed, stochastic variable z is governed by a stationary AR(1)
process. Final goods can be consumed or accumulated as additional capi-
tal by households. Additionally, there is a central government that eats up
some of the economy’s output in every period.
The central assumption of the model is that, in every period, a fraction   of
the capital stock is lost or destroyed. This is a natural way to capture the
economic impact of a domestic, armed conflict or rebellion. Furthermore,
it is assumed that   is a decreasing function of military expenditure. The idea
behind this assumption is that the higher the capacity of the government to
finance the defense sector, the higher the chances of dominating or neutral-
izing rebellion and, thereby, avoiding the associated economic costs [see
Collier and Hoeffler (1998)].
Note then that government expenditure (g) can be of two types: military
[exp(m)] and non-military [exp(s)]. Both m and s are driven by stationary
AR(1) stochastic processes. It is assumed that non-military expenditure
simply generates a pure negative income effect on the economy (i.e. the
resources are thrown away into the ocean). Military expenditure, on the
other hand, does not generate a pure negative income effect: even though it
reduces the volume of output available for private expenditure (consump-
tion or investment), it also lowers the fraction of the capital stock that is
destroyed in every period. Hence, the model captures a simple trade-off
in military expenditure: crowding out of private consumption and in-
vestment, but less destruction (and, therefore, higher marginal pro-
ductivity) of private capital (and labor).
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A central planner solves the following sequential problem:
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k0 given
It can be deducted easily that, in every period t, the state is given by (kt, zt,
mt, st) while the control is given by (ct, nt, kt+1).
Mathematically, one can identify the trade-off in military expenditure by
rewriting the resource constraint in the following way:
( ) () () ( ) exp 1 1 1 tt t t tt amb m y b m k
α
δ += −+ − − % (1)
where  ) exp( 1 t t t t s k c a + + = +  represents non-military expenditure and
() ( )
1
exp tt t t yz k n h
α α −
= % represents output gross of capital destruction.
The left hand side (lhs) of the constraint captures the cost of increasing
military spending while the right hand side (rhs) captures the associated
benefit. Indeed, as the lhs shows, a higher mt takes away or crowds-out
resources available for non-military absorption. However, as portrayed in
the rhs, and recalling that b<0, a higher mt enhances the volume of avail-
able resources by reducing the destruction of capital and, therefore, in-
creasing the marginal productivity of both capital and labor. The following
graph depicts the net benefit of military expenditure4:
4 To graph this function the steady state values of γ and k  were used. ∼
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Graph 1.
Not surprisingly, the graph shows that additional military spending does not
always bring about a positive net benefit on the economy. Indeed, the net benefit
decreases monotonically with military expenditure so that there exists a thresh-
old beyond which additional military spending imposes a net cost on the economy.
Such threshold is given by the intersection of the curve and the x-axis.
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() ( )
1 log exp 1 1 1 exp exp
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log 1 , , ,
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αα α γδ γ
β
− ⎧⎫ ⎡⎤ ′ −+ − − − − − ⎪⎪ ⎣⎦ = ⎨⎬
′′ ′′ +− + ⎪⎪ ⎩⎭
s.t.
y = bm
z· = µ0 (1 ￿ ρ0) + ρ0z + ε·, ε ∼ N(0,σε
2)
m· = µ1 (1 ￿ ρ1) + ρ1m + υ·, υ ∼ N(0,συ
2)
s· = µ2 (1 ￿ ρ2) + ρ2s + η·, η ∼ N(0,ση
2)
From the first order and envelope conditions the following optimality con-
ditions are obtained:
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(2) is the Euler Equation governing the optimal consumption/capital accumula-
tion path. As usual, it demands that the marginal cost and benefit of accumulat-
ing as capital an additional unit of output (instead of consuming it) be equated.
The marginal cost is given by the forgone marginal utility of consumption today
[lhs of (2)]. The marginal benefit is given by the expected discounted value of
the marginal utility obtained from next period’s marginal productivity of the
additional unit of capital together with its non-depreciated fraction [rhs of (2)].
Interestingly, the rhs of (2) reveals that the internal conflict distorts the capital
accumulation decision. In fact, the internal conflict (i.e. γt+1) reduces the expected
value of the marginal productivity of capital in the future. This reduces the marginal
benefit of accumulating capital and, thereby, implies less incentives to invest.
Equation (3) captures the intratemporal labor-supply decision. It is a stand-
ard condition that equates the marginal benefit (in utils) of one additional
unit of employment (lhs) to the marginal cost (also in utils) of supplying that
additional unit of employment (rhs). The lhs of (3) shows that the internal
conflict also distorts the labor-supply decision. Specifically, the internal
conflict (i.e.γt) reduces the marginal productivity of employment. Hence,
the internal conflict reduces the marginal benefit of supplying labor and,
thereby, implies less incentives to operate productively in the market.
In sum, the model captures the economic costs of the conflict with the
intertemporal and intratemporal distortions embedded in the optimality
conditions (2) and (3). By reducing the incentives to invest and to work,
both distortions imply a smaller volume of output (and welfare) in the
stationary state of the economy, relative to a peaceful world.
II. Calibration
Parameters were calibrated to an annual frequency using Colombian data
for the period 1952-1997 (see calibration appendix). Data was taken from
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DNP (1998), SÆnchez (1994), GRECO (1999), Ministerio de Hacienda,
Contralor￿a General de la Republica (CGR) and DANE. Military expendi-
ture data comes from DNP (1998) and CGR.
Following Cooley and Prescott (1995), parameter values were chosen so
that the model, in stationary state, replicates the following 1952-1997
averages observed in Colombia:









γ − a  γ n labor share capital share
0.74 0.14 0.17 2.63 0.03 0.90 0.60 0.40
a Recall that observed capital is given by (1￿γ)k
The following table illustrates the calibrated parameter values (see calibration
appendix):
Table 4. Calibrated Parameter Values.
β h δ ab
0.909 0.615 0.022 0.4 -0.01
The stochastic processes governing z, m and s were estimated using OLS
techniques5. The next table exhibits the estimated parameter values of such
processes6:
Table 5. Estimated Parameter Values.
µ0 µ1 µ2 ρ0 ρ1 ρ2 σε συ ση
0 -3 -2.04 0.98 0.94 0.97 0.017 0.078 0.057
5 In the estimation of the processes of m and s time dummies were introduced to reduce the
variance of the estimated residuals. Otherwise, huge, extraordinary, investment expenditures
in the military sector introduce a lot of noise into the series
6 µ0, µ1 and µ2 were not estimated; they were fixed for calibration purposes (see calibration
appendix).
￿
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III. Experiment
To estimate the impact of a military expenditure shock over the economy
an impulse-response exercise was carried out using the calibrated model.
The experiment consisted of a one standard deviation shock to the noise
term in the stochastic process driving military expenditure. The shock is
equivalent to an increase of 0.32% of GDP in military expenditure. The
experiment’s results were extrapolated linearly to quantify the impact of a
military expenditure shock of 1% of GDP7,8. The cumulated impact over
output, consumption and investment per capita over the next ten years is
reported in the following table:
Table 6. Cumulated Effects
(2003 US$ and percentage terms).
yci
1 year 25.2 -9.9 7.5
(1.37%) (-0.82%) (4.56%)
2 years 49.9 -15.7 12.4
(2.71%) (-1.29%) (7.60%)
5 years 118.8 -16.8 17.8
(6.46%) (-1.39%) (10.90%)
10 years 214.9 8.7 9.9
(11.68%) (0.72%) (6.08%)
According to table 6, one year after the shock output and investment per
capita are 1.37% and 4.56% higher than in steady state. In contrast,
consumption per capita lies 0.82% below its steady state level. The
intuition is quite simple. The military expenditure shock not only increases
aggregate demand (crowding-out private consumption and investment),
but also operates as a positive productivity shock inducing an increase in
investment (and labor supply). The latter effect over investment offsets
7 Recall that the Colombian government’s policy is to increase military expenditure perma-
nently in 1% of GDP. This expenditure hike was initially financed with a once-and-for-all
1.2% wealth tax on households, and firms with net worth above COP $169.5 million
(between US$58,000 and US$59,000).
8 Even though the shock in the experiment does not capture literally a permanent increase
in military spending (the process driving m is stationary), the high persistence of the
shock captures a long-lasting increase in military expenditure (see Table 5).
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the former one (i.e. investment goes up). Due to the resource constraint
and despite the increase in output (due to the positive productivity shock),
the increase in military expenditure and investment must be accompanied
by a fall in consumption.
But even though consumption falls on impact (to open up space for addi-
tional military expenditure and private investment), the cumulated output gains
allow consumption to increase above its stationary trend three periods after
the shock and to remain on positive grounds thereafter. Indeed, the cumu-
lated net effect over all variables is positive. For instance, ten years after the
shock, the cumulated net gain for output, investment and consumption per
capita amounts to US$ 215, US$ 9 and US$ 10, respectively (see table 6).
Conclusions
This paper suggests a model to capture the natural trade-off in military
expenditure: crowding-out of private spending, but less destruction (and,
therefore, higher marginal productivity) of private capital and labor. The
model is calibrated to Colombian data. An experiment with the model
reveals that a long-lasting, 1% of GDP increase in military expenditure
(current policy in such country) is expansionary in terms of output, investment
and consumption levels.
Given the response of consumption (negative US$ 10 on impact but US$ 9
- cumulative - after 10 years), the net effect over welfare, measured as the
(risk-aversion adjusted) present discounted value of the consumption flow,
is not clear. However, in these type of models quantitative results must no
be taken literally. They must be interpreted in relation to the response of
other variables. Hence, this paper only proves that after a highly persistent,
1% of GDP, military expenditure shock to the Colombian economy, there is
a positive cumulated effect over output (US$ 215) that is much higher than
that over investment (US$ 10) and consumption (US$ 9). But, again, this
does not necessarily mean that the welfare effect is negligible or negative. The
dynamics of the model allow for a considerable welfare-enhancing effect.
Finally, it is important to note that the model does not capture the
distortionary effects of the taxes that must be levied to finance military expendi-
ture. Of course, these effects distortions reduce the positive impact of military
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spending. However, the magnitude of these effects depends on the type of
tax that is levied. The design of the optimal tax structure to finance military
spending is left for future research.
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Calibration appendix
Parameter values were chosen so that the model, in stationary state, mim-
ics some long-run empirical regularities observed in Colombia. Specifi-
cally, the parameters were calibrated to an annual frequency using Colombian
data for the period 1952-1997. Data was taken from DNP (1998), SÆnchez
(1994), GRECO (1999), Ministerio de Hacienda, Contralor￿a General de
la Repœblica (CGR) and DANE. Military expenditure data comes from
DNP (1998) and CGR.
The calibration process requires that the objects of the model have an
appropriate empirical counterpart. As is standard in the RBC literature
[see Cooley and Prescott (1995)], in this class of models the stock of
capital must have as empirical counterpart not only private capital, but also
public capital and the stock of consumer durables. Additionally, net exports
must be treated as investment given that the model portrays a closed
economy. Thus, measured investment should be adjusted to include public
investment, consumption of durables and net exports so that the macro
identity in the data is properly mapped into the model. Moreover, the proper
empirical counterpart of the model’s output (y) should be observed GDP
adjusted to include income imputable to public capital and to the stock of
consumer durables. However, due to the nature of this paper’s model and to
the nature and availability of Colombian data, the data treatment must deviate
a little from the standard technique suggested by Cooley and Prescott (1995).
In contrast to the U.S., total investment in Colombian national accounts
includes not only private investment but also public investment. Conse-
quently, the adjustment of observed GDP and observed investment to ac-
count for public investment should not be relevant in Colombian data (i.e.
the adjustment is already in the observed data). Nonetheless, military ex-
penditure in the model is an abstraction of both operational and investment
expenditures in the defense and security sector. As a result, non-military
expenditure in the model should also refer to both operational and investment
expenditures in the non-military sectors of the government. Therefore, public
investment was extracted from the total investment series in the national
accounts and added to the public expenditure series. Of course, public
capital and income imputable to public capital were also extracted from the
observed total capital stock and GDP series, respectively9. In sum, in the
model capital as well as investment are private.
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Due to data limitations, durable consumption had to be treated as pure
consumption. Hence, the stock of consumer durables could not be added
to the capital stock, observed investment could not be augmented with
durable consumption and observed GDP could not be adjusted to include
income imputable to the stock of durables. It is also important to highlight
that, according to the model, the stock of observed or measurable capital
is given by  (1￿γ)k instead of k. Thus, for calibration purposes, the ob-
served average capital-output ratio was divided by the mean of (1-γ) to
obtain the correct empirical counterpart of the model’s k/y. Finally, it should
be noted that employment in the model (n) is to be interpreted as (number
of occupied persons)/(economically active population).
The calibration process was divided in three steps.
Step 1: (b, µ µ µ µ µ1)
Let a bar above a variable represent its steady state level.  With this nota-





1 ) ( ) 1 ( ) exp( h n k z y
This is:
α α α γ
− − =
1 ) ( ) exp( ) 1 ( h n k z y
  y ~ ) 1 (
α γ − =
where 
α α − =
1 ) ( ) exp( ~ h n k z y  represents steady state output gross of capital
destruction (i.e. steady state output without conflict). Note:
9 To compute income imputable to public capital (kG) the methodology of Cooley and
Prescott (1995) was employed. Income imputable to public capital (yG) is given by:
G G G G k r y ) ( δ + =
where rG is the rate of return of public capital and δG is its rate of depreciation. To
compute income imputable to public capital rG =10% and δG = 7.3% were taken from
SÆnchez (1994).
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It can be deducted that:
α γ ) 1 ( 1 − = −cc
where cc stands for the cost of the conflict in terms of output levels. Thus:
α γ
/ 1 ) 1 ( 1 cc − − =
To pin down the value of γ  one can use the previous equation and an
estimate of the cost of the armed conflict in Colombia. Trujillo and Badel
(1998) and Contralor￿a General de la Repœblica (2002) estimate that the
average net cost of the armed conflict is 1.1% and 1.34% of GDP, respec-
tively. With these estimates the resulting values of γ  are 0.027 y 0.033,





m = E(m) = µ1
is the unconditional mean of mt. Thus:
b =
 γ
     µ1
(1A)
Now, recall that the steady state value of military expenditure is given
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exp (s) = exp (µ2). The values of  µ1 and µ2 are not important as long as
they are consistent with the value of total public expenditure in the cali-
brated resource constraint [i.e. as long as exp (µ1) + exp (µ2) = g and
c + i + g = y ]. Therefore, the value of  µ1 was set arbitrarily at:
µ1 = ￿3 (2A)
while the value of µ2 was obtained residually in order to guarantee consist-
ency with the calibrated resource constraint (see Step 3 below).
Note then that given:
γ = 0.027
equations (1A) and (2A) determine:
b = ￿ 0.009
Step 2: (α α α α α, δ δ δ δ δ, β β β β β, h)
Note that:
Hence:
α = capital share (3A)
Now, consider the resource constraint in steady state:
c + i + g = y
        ∂y  k
α =  ∂k
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Given that:
k k i ) 1 )( 1 ( γ δ − − − =
k ) ( γ δ γ δ − + =
Then:
y g k c = + − + + ) ( γ δ γ δ
This is:







γ δ γ δ
or:
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(4A)
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Note then that given10:














) 615 . 0 , 909 . 0 , 022 . 0 , 4 . 0 ( ) , , , ( = = Ψ h β δ α
Step 3: (µ µ µ µ µ0, µ µ µ µ µ1, µ µ µ µ µ2, ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ0, ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ1, ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ2, σ σ σ σ σε ε ε ε ε, σ σ σ σ συ υ υ υ υ, σ σ σ σ ση η η η η)
Parameters (µ0,, ρ0, ρ1, ρ2, σε, συ, ση) were estimated using OLS tech-
niques11:
10 The value for γ was obtained in Step 1 above.  The rest of the data (i.e. k/y,c/y,g/y,n,
capitalshare) is observed and comes from the sources mentioned at the beginning of this
appendix.
11 In the estimation of the processes of m and s, time dummies were introduced to reduce the
variance of the estimated residuals. Otherwise, huge, extraordinary, investment expenditures
in the military sector introduce a lot of noise into the series.
￿￿￿￿￿￿
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µ0 ρ0 ρ1 ρ2 σε συ ση
0 0.98 0.94 0.97 0.017 0.078 0.057
As was mentioned in Step 1, the process to calibrate µ2 is quite different
and requires some algebraic manipulation. From the Euler equation [i.e.
equation (2)] in steady state:
  [ ] ) 1 )( 1 ( ) ( ) 1 ( 1
1 1 γ δ γ α β
α α α − − + − =
− − h n k
This is:
) 1 )( 1 ( ) 1 (
1
1
γ δ γ α
β
α
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Now, equation (3) in stationary state is given by:
) 1 log(
) ( ) 1 )( 1 (
h
c
h h n k
− − =
− −
−α α α γ α
This is:






















) 1 )( 1 (
(8A)
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Now, consider the resource constraint in steady state:
y g i c = + +
y g k c = + − + + ) ( γ δ γ δ
g y k c − = − + + ) ( γ δ γ δ










− = − + + 1 ) ( γ δ γ δ
This is also equivalent to:
α α α γ γ δ γ δ


































































































) ( ) 1 ( 1 γ δ γ δ γ
α α − + − − −
= (9A)
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Given that:
g m s = + ) exp( ) exp(
g = + ) exp( ) exp( 2 2 µ µ
it follows that:
µ2 = log [g ￿ exp (µ1)] (11A)
Note then, that given12:
equations (7A)-(11A) determine:
µ2 = ￿2.04
12 The value for γ was obtained in Step 1 above. The value for  1 was also calibrated in Step
1 above. The rest of the data (α, δ, β,  h) observed and come from the sources mentioned
at the beginning of this appendix.
￿
Ξ = [
 g ,γ,µ1,α,δ,β,h] = [0.17,0.027,￿3,0.4,0.022,0.909,0.615]
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Graph appendix
Graph 1A. Response of Output.
Graph 2A. Response of Private Investment.
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Graph 3A. Response of Consumption.
Graph 4A. Response of Employment Rate.
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